This paper proposes that idiosyncratic firm-level fluctuations can explain an important part of aggregate shocks, and provide a microfoundation for aggregate productivity shocks.
I. Introduction
This paper proposes a simple origin of aggregate shocks. It develops the view that a large part of aggregate fluctuations arises from idiosyncratic shocks to individual firms. This approach sheds light on a number of issues that are difficult to address in models that postulate aggregate shocks. Although economy-wide shocks (inflation, wars, policy shocks) are no doubt important, they have difficulty in explaining most fluctuations (Cochrane 1994 , Summers 1986 . Often, the explanation for year-to-year jumps of aggregate quantities is elusive. On the other hand, there is a large amount of anecdotal evidence for the importance of idiosyncratic shocks. For instance, in December 2004, the $24 billion one-time Microsoft dividend boosted growth in personal income from 0.6% to 3.7%. 1 A macroeconomist would have difficulty in explaining this jump in personal income without examining individual firm behavior. The OECD (2004) analyzes that in 2000, Nokia contributed 1.6 percentage points of Findland's GDP growth. 2 Likewise, shocks to GDP may stem from a variety of events, such as successful innovations by Wal-Mart, the difficulties of a Japanese bank, new exports by Boeing, a strike at General Motors. 3 Since modern economies are dominated by large firms, idiosyncratic shocks to these firms can lead to non-trivial aggregate shocks. For instance, in Japan, the top 10 firms account for 35% of the exports (Canals et al. 2005) . For the U.S., Figure I reports the total sales of the top 50 and 100 firms as a fraction of GDP. On average, the sales of the top 50 firms are 19% of GDP, while the sales of the top 100 firms are 27% of GDP. The top 100 firms hence represent a large part of the macroeconomic activity, and so understanding their actions gives a good insight into aggregate economy.
In this view, many economic fluctuations are not due, primitively, to small diffuse shocks that directly affect every firm. Instead, many economic fluctuations are attributable to the incompressible "grains" of economic activity, the large firms. I call this view the "granular" hypothesis. In the granular view, idiosyncratic shocks to large firms have the potential to generate small aggregate shocks that affect GDP, and via general equilibrium, all firms.
The granular hypothesis offers a microfoundation for the aggregate shocks of real business 1 Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, January 31, 2005. 2 The example of Nokia is extreme but may be useful. In 2003, worldwide sales of Nokia were $37 billion, representing 26% of Finland's GDP of $142 billion. This is not sufficient for a proper assessment of Nokia's importance, but gives some order of magnitude, as the Finnish base of Nokia is an important residual claimant of the fluctuations of Nokia International. 3 See McKinsey (2001) and Hausman and Leibtag (2005) for an assessment of the impact of WalMart on the U.S. economy. cycle models (Kydland and Prescott 1982) . Hence, real business cycle shocks are not, at heart, mysterious "aggregate productivity shocks" or "a measure of our ignorance" (Abramovitz 1956 ).
Instead, they are well-defined shocks to individual firms. The granular hypothesis sheds light on a number of other issues, such as the dependence of the amplitude of GDP fluctuations on GDP level, the microeconomic composition of GDP, the distribution of GDP and firm-level fluctuations.
In most of this paper, the standard deviation of the percentage growth rate of a firm is assumed to be independent of its size. 4 This explains why individual firms can matter in the aggregate. If Wal-Mart doubles its number of supermarkets and thus its size, its variance is not divided by two -as would be the case if Wal-Mart was the amalgamation of many independent supermarkets. Instead, the newly acquired supermarkets inherit the "Wal-Mart" shocks, and the total percentage variance of Wal-Mart does not change. This paper conceptualizes these shocks as productivity growth, but the analysis holds for other shocks. 5 The main argument is summarized as follows. First, it is critical to show that 1/ √ N diversification does not occur in an economy with a fat-tailed distribution of firms. A simple diversification argument shows that, in an economy with N firms with independent shocks, aggregate fluctuations should have a size proportional to 1/ √ N . Given that modern economies can have millions of firms, this suggests that idiosyncratic fluctuations will have a negligible aggregate effect. This paper points out that, when firm size is power-law distributed, the conditions under which one derives the central limit theorem break down, and other mathematics apply (see Appendix 1). In the central case of Zipf's law, aggregate volatility decays according to 1/ ln N , rather than 1/ √ N . The strong 1/ √ N diversification is replaced by a much milder one that decays according to 1/ ln N . In an economy with a fat-tailed distribution of firms, diversification effects due to country size are quite small.
Section IV then investigates accordingly the proportion of aggregate shocks that can be accounted for by idiosyncratic fluctuations. I construct the "granular residual" Γ t , which is a parsimonious measure of the shocks to the top 100 firms:
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, where g it −g t is a simple measure of the idiosyncratic shock to firm i. Regressing the growth rate of GDP on the granular residual yields an R 2 of roughly one third. Prima facie, this means that idiosyncratic shocks to the top 100 firms in the U.S. can explain one third of the fluctuations of GDP and the Solow residual.
Having established that idiosyncratic shocks do not die out in the aggregate, I show in section V that they are of the correct order of magnitude to explain business cycles. A result based on Hulten (1978) shows that, if firm i has a productivity shock dπ i , these shocks are i.i.d., and there is no amplification mechanism, then the standard deviation of TFP growth is σ T F P = σ π h S , where σ π is the standard deviation of the i.i.d. productivity shocks, and h S is the sales Herfindahl of the economy. Using the estimate of volatility of productivity of σ π = 12%/year, the sales Herfindahl of h S = 6.1% for the US in 2002, one predicts a TFP volatility equal to σ T F P = 12% · 6.1% = 0.9%. Standard amplification mechanisms generate the order of magnitude of business cycle fluctuations, σ GDP = 1.4%. Non-US data leads to even labor, is on strike for half the year. For many purposes, its effective productivity that year is halved. This paper does not require the productivity shocks to arise from any particular source.
larger business cycle fluctuations. I conclude that idiosyncratic volatility seems quantitatively large enough to matter at the macroeconomic level.
Previous economists have proposed mechanisms that generate macroeconomic shocks from purely microeconomic causes. A pioneering paper is Jovanovic (1987) , whose models generate non-vanishing aggregate fluctuations owing to a multiplier proportional to √ N , the square root of the number of firms. However, Jovanovic's theoretical multiplier of √ N ' 1000 is much larger than is empirically plausible. 6 Nonetheless, Jovanovic's model spawned a lively intellectual quest. Durlauf (1993) generates macroeconomic uncertainty with idiosyncratic shocks and local interactions between firms. The drivers of his results are the non-linear interactions between firms, while in this paper it is the skewed distribution of firms. Bak, Chen, Scheinkman, and Woodford (1993) apply the physical theory of self-organizing criticality. While there is much to learn from their approach, it generates fluctuations more fat-tailed than in reality, with infinite means. Nirei (2005) proposes a model where aggregate fluctuations arise from (s,S) rules at the firm level, in the spirit of Bak et al. (1993) . These models are conceptually innovative, but they they are hard to work with theoretically and empirically. The mechanism proposed in this paper is tractable, and relies on readily observable quantities. Long and Plosser (1983) suggest that sectorial (rather than firm) shocks might account for GDP fluctuations. As their model has a small number of sectors, those shocks can be viewed as mini-aggregate shocks. Horvath (1998 Horvath ( , 2000 and Conley and Dupor (2003) explore this hypothesis further. They find that sector-specific shocks are an important source of aggregate volatility.
Finally, Horvath (1998) and Dupor (1999) debate whether N sectors can have a volatility that does not decay according to 1/ √ N . I find an alternative solution to their debate, which is, formalized in Proposition 2. My approach relies on those earlier contributions, and clarifies that the fat-tailed nature of the sectoral shocks is important theoretically, as it determines whether the central limit theorem applies.
Studies disagree somewhat on the relative importance of sector specific shocks, aggregate shocks, and complementarities. Shea (2002) quantifies that complementarities play a major role in aggregate business cycle fluctuations. Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger (1997) find that aggregate shocks are important, while Horvath (1998) concludes that sector-specific shocks go a long way toward explaining aggregate disturbances. Pareto (1896) was the first to discover that the income distribution follows a power law. A growing number of other economic variables appear to follow power laws: in particular Zipf's law, which is a power law with an exponent close to 1. This includes the size of cities (Zipf 1949, Gabaix and Ioannides 2004) , firms (Axtell 2001 , Fujiwara et al. 2004 , Okuyama et al. 1999 , mutual funds (Gabaix et al. 2006) , and websites (Barabasi and Albert 1999). The origin of this Zipf distribution is becoming better understood (Simon 1955 , Gabaix 1999 , Gabaix and Ioannides 2004 , Luttmer 2005 , Rossi-Hansberg and Wright 2005 . Stock market fluctuations also follow power laws, with remarkably stable exponents. Gabaix et al. (2006) propose an explanation for the fat-tailed distribution of financial returns. They base their explanation on a power law distribution of institutional investors, which is also a form of granular explanation.
Granular effects are likely to be even stronger outside the U.S, as the U.S. is more diversified than most other countries. One number reported in the literature is the value of the assets controlled by the richest 10 families, divided by GDP. Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) find a number equal to 38% in Asia, including 84% of GDP in Hong Kong, 76% in Malaysia, 39% in Thailand. Faccio and Lang (2002) also find that the top 10 families control 21% of listed assets in their sample of European firms. It would be interesting to transpose the present analysis to those countries, and to other entities than firms -for instance, business groups, or sectors.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II develops a simple model. Section III provides a richer model that gives a foundation for the measurement of idiosyncratic shocks, and spells out how production linkages can make all microeconomic and macroeconomic variables comove.
Section IV shows directly that the idiosyncratic movements of firms appear to explain, year by year, about one third of actual fluctuations in GDP and the Solow residual. Section V provides a calibration that shows that the effects are of the right order of magnitude to account for macroeconomic fluctuations. Section VI concludes.
II. The core idea II.A. A simple "islands" economy
This section uses a concise model to illustrate the idea. In this economy there are only idiosyncratic shocks to firms. Let S it represent firm i's production in year t. It experiences a growth rate:
where σ i is firm i's volatility and ε i,t+1 are uncorrelated random variables with mean 0 and variance 1. Total GDP is:
and GDP growth is
As the shocks ε i,t+1 are uncorrelated, the standard deviation of GDP growth is σ GDP = ³ var
Hence the variance of GDP, σ 2 GDP , is the weighted sum of the variance σ 2 i of idiosyncratic shocks with weights equal to
, the squared share of output for which that firm i accounts. If the firms all have the same volatility σ i = σ, we obtain:
where h is the square root of the sales Herfindahl of the economy:
For simplicity, h will be referred to as the "Herfindahl" of the economy.
This paper works first with the basic model (1)-(2), which can be viewed as the linearization of a host of richer models, such as the one in section III. The arguments apply if general equilibrium mechanisms are added.
II.B. The 1/ √ N argument for the irrelevance of idiosyncratic shocks
Macroeconomists often appeal to aggregate (or at least sector-wide) shocks, since idiosyncratic fluctuations disappear in the aggregate if there is a large number of firms N . Consider firms of initially identical size equal to 1/N of GDP, and identical standard deviation σ i = σ. Then (4)- (5) gives:
To estimate the order of magnitude of the cumulative effect of idiosyncratic shocks, take an estimate of firm volatility σ = 12% from Section (V), and consider an economy with N = 10 6 firms 7 . Then
Such a GDP volatility of 0.012% is much too small to account for the empirically-measured size of macroeconomic fluctuations of around 1%. This is why economists typically appeal to aggregate shocks. More general modeling assumptions predict a 1/ √ N scaling, as shown by the next Proposition, whose proof is in Appendix 2.
Proposition 1 Consider an islands economy with N firms whose sizes are drawn from a distribution with finite variance. Suppose that they all have the same volatility σ. Then the economy's GDP volatility is:
Proposition 1 will be contrasted with Proposition 2 below, which shows that different models of the size distribution of firms lead to dramatically different results.
II.C. Empirical evidence that the distribution of firms is leptokurtic
Empirical evidence suggests that a good parameterization for the firm size distribution is a power law distribution:
for x > a 1/ζ . To estimate (7), it is useful to take the density f (x) = ζa/x ζ+1 , and its logarithm
where C is a constant. An extensive literature has estimated the size distribution of firms, but typically the sample includes only firms listed in the stock market. Axtell (2001) extends the literature by using the Census, which lists all the U.S. firms.
I reproduce his plot of (8) in Figure II . The horizontal axis shows ln x, where x is the size of a firm in number of employees. The vertical axis shows the log of the fraction of firms with size x, ln f (x). We expect to see a straight line in the region where (8) holds, and indeed the Figure   7 Axtell (2001) reports that in 1997 there were 5.5 million firms in the United States.
Figure II: Log frequency ln f (S) vs log size ln S of U.S. firm sizes (by number of employees) for 1997. OLS fit gives a slope of 2.059 (s.e.= 0.054; R 2 =0.992). This corresponds to a frequency f (S) ∼ S −2.059 , i.e. a power law distribution with exponent ζ = 1.059. This is very close to Zipf's law, which says that ζ = 1. Source: Axtell (2001) .
shows a very clear fit. 8 An OLS fit of (8) yields an estimate of R 2 = 0.992, and ζ = 1.059±0.054.
The size distribution of U.S. firms is well approximated by the power law with exponent ζ = 1. 9
The rest of the paper will pay special attention to the case ζ = 1, the "Zipf" value. This value (ζ ' 1) is often found in the social sciences, for instance in the size of cities (Zipf 1949) , and in the amount of assets under management of mutual funds (Gabaix et al. 2003) and banks (Pushkin and Hassan 2004) . 10 The origins of this distribution are becoming better understood 11 .
The power law distribution (7) has fat tails, and thus produces some very large firms. The next section studies its implications for GDP fluctuations.
II.D. The failure of the 1/ √ N argument with power law firms
The next Proposition examines behavior under a "fat-tailed" distribution of firms. The proof is in Appendix 2.
Proposition 2 Consider an islands economy with a large number N of firms with volatility of growth rate σ, and whose size distribution is a power law distribution P (S > x) = ax −ζ with exponent ζ ≥ 1. Then its GDP volatility is:
where v ζ is a random variable that is independent of N and σ.
The firm size distribution has thin tails, i.e. finite variance, if and only if ζ > 2. Proposition 1 states that if the firm size distribution has thin tails, then σ GDP decays according to as 1/ √ N .
In contrast, Proposition 2 states that if the firm size distribution has fat tails (ζ < 2), σ GDP decays much more slowly than 1/ √ N .
In the limit case of Zipf's law (ζ = 1), larger countries are barely more diversified than small countries. 12 The reason is that, if Zipf's law holds, the top K firms of a country account for a finite, as opposed to infinitessimal, fraction of the total output. 13 To see the result, take two countries, 1 and 2, and suppose that country 2 is twice as large as country 1, in the sense that it has twice as many firms as country 1. Firms in both countries are drawn from the same distribution. If Zipf's law holds, then the largest firm of country 2 will be, on average, twice as large as the largest firm in country 1. Indeed, the largest K firms will be, on average, twice as large in country 2 than in country 1. Hence, the relative share of the top K firms will be the same in country 2 and country 1. The Herfindahls are the same, and, as GDP volatility comes only from firm-level volatility in the scenario considered in Proposition 2, GDP volatilities are the same. If the distribution is a power law with exponent ζ between 1 and 2, the same reasoning holds, except that the largest firms in country 2 are 2 1/ζ larger than in country 1, so their share of GDP is 2 1/ζ−1 < 1 that of country 1. Thus the volatility of country 2 is that of country 1, times 2 1/ζ−1 , as given by equation 10.
Proposition 2 offers a resolution to the debate between Horvath (1998 Horvath ( , 2000 
2 N reveals the "effective" number of firms in the economy, for diversification purposes. So, in a Zipfian world (where ζ = 1), the effective number of firms is not N but (ln N) 2 . For 1 < ζ < 2, the effective number of firms scales as N 2−2/ζ . This notion of the "effective" number of firms is important as long as diversification plays a role, as is the case in Caballero and Engel (2004) and the present paper.
13 This is true up to a slowly varying factor, 1/ ln N.
firm sizes was lognormal with a sufficiently high variance, then quantitatively very little would change.
II.E. GDP volatility when the volatility of a firm depends on its size (Stanley et al. 1996 , Amaral et al. 1997 ) quantify the relation more precisely, and showed that (12) holds for firms in Compustat,
It is unclear whether the conclusions from Compustat can generalize to the whole economy.
Compustat only comprises firms traded on the stock market and these are likely to be more volatile than non-traded firms, as small volatile firms are more likely to seek outside equity financing, while large firms are in any case very likely to be listed in the stock market. This selection bias implies that the value of α measured from Compustat firms alone is likely to be larger than in a sample composed of all firms. It is indeed possible α may be 0 when estimated on a sample that includes all firms, as random growth models have long postulated. Axtell and Teitelbaum (2005) , using on two years of data from the U.S. census, conclude that α ' 0.
Further research is needed to verify this on a comprehensive set of large firms over a long time period.
In any case, any deviations from Gibrat's law for variances are likely to be small, i.e. 0 ≤ α ≤ 1/6. If there is no diversification as size increases, then α = 0. If there is full diversification, and a firm of size S is composed of S units, then α = 1/2. Empirically, firms are much closer to the "Gibrat" benchmark of no diversification, α = 0.
The next Proposition extends Propositions 1 and 2 to the case where firm volatility decreases with firm size.
Proposition 3 Consider an islands economy, with N firms that have power law distribution
Assume that the volatility of a firm of size S is
for some α > 0. Define
GDP fluctuations have the form:
such that when N → ∞, g t converges to a non-degenerate distribution. When ζ > 1, g t converges to a Lévy stable distribution with exponent min {ζ/ (1 − α) , 2}.
In particular, the volatility σ (S) of GDP growth decreases as a power law function of GDP
To see the intuition for Proposition 3, we apply the case of Zipf's law (ζ = 1) to the twocountry example of Proposition 2. 15 Country 2 has twice as many firms as country 1. Its largest K firms are twice as large as the largest firms of country 1. However, scaling according to (12) implies that their volatility is 2 −α times the volatility of firms in country 1. Hence, the volatility of country 2's GDP is 2 −α times the volatility of country 1's GDP, i.e. (16). Putting this another way, under the case presented by Proposition 3, and ζ = 1, large firms are less volatile than small firms (equation 12). The top firms in big countries are larger (in an absolute sense) than top firms in small countries. As the top firms determine a country's volatility, big countries have less volatile GDP than small countries (equation 16).
Also, one can reinterpret Proposition 3 by interpreting a large "firm" as a "country" made up of smaller entities. If these entities follow a power-law distribution, then Proposition 3 applies and predicts that the fluctuations of the growth rate ∆ ln S it , once re-scaled by S −α it , follow a Lévy distribution with exponent min {ζ/ (1 − α) , 2}. Amaral et al. (1997) and Canning et al. (1998) plot this empirical distribution, which looks roughly like a Lévy stable distribution. It could be that the fat tails distribution of firm growth come from the fat tail distribution of the 14 In this paper, f (S) ∼ g (S) for some functions f, g, means that the ratio f (S) /g (S) tends, for large S, to be a positive real number. So f and g have the same scaling "up to a constant real factor". 15 When ζ = 1, the limiting distribution of g is a more complicated distribution, a ratio of two non-independent Lévy distributions. Logan et al. (1973) provide an analysis of some such ratios.
subcomponents of a firm. 16 A corollary of Proposition 3 may be worth highlighting.
Corollary 1 (Similar scaling of firms and countries.) When Zipf 's law holds (ζ = 1) and α ≤ 1/2, we have α 0 = α, i.e. firms and countries should see their volatility scale with a similar exponent:
Interestingly, Canning et al. (1998) and Lee et al. (1998) present evidence that supports (17), with an small exponent α ' α 0 ' 1/6. A more systematic investigation of this issue would be interesting.
III. A model with comovement
The previous section has shown that how idiosyncratic firm shocks might explain a significant portion of aggregate fluctuations. This section considers whether they can also create plausibly the strong comovements between the various firms or sectors of the economy, as observed, for instance, by Long and Plosser (1983) , Shea (2002) and Stock and Watson (2005) . Horvath (1998), Long and Plosser (1983) and Shea (2002) present models that generate comovement. 17 Horvath (2000) calibrates a dynamic general equilibrium model with many sectors. I present a simplified version of those models. Its main virtue is that it is solvable in closed form, so that the mechanisms are fairly transparent.
After a shock to firm i, all the other firms adjust instantaneously, rather than over time through the input-output matrix. There is an aggregate good. Each intermediate good firm i uses L i , K i , X i of labor, capital and aggregate good, to produce:
16 See Sutton (2002) for a related model; and Wyart and Bouchaud (2003) for a related analysis, which acknowledges the contribution of the present article.
17 Long and Plosser (1983) impose a Cobb-Douglas structure, which imposes zero idiosyncratic movement in the sales per employee and dollar sales.
GDP is production net of the intermediate inputs, the X i 's:
with ψ > 1. b is the share of intermediate inputs, and will also be the ratio of value added to sales, both at the level of the firm, and of the economy.
The representative agent's utility function is U = C− L 1/ξ . 18 There is no investment, so
To abstract from a potential inefficiency arising from positive markups, I assume that the prices equal marginal cost. Several devices can generate this assumption that prices equal marginal cost. Firms could be competitive because there is free entry -markets are contestable in the sense of Baumol (1982) . Another interpretation is that the "firms" are sectors made of competitive firms. A last possibility is that the government may have set an input subsidy equal to ψ for the intermediary firms. In any case, even if there was a strictly positive, constant markup, the formulas for the main results of this section (Proposition 4) would be unaffected.
The model gives:
The result is standard, except for the b term in Eq. (21), which indicates that 1/b is a "productivity multiplier". If all firms increase their productivity A i by 1%, TFP increases by 1/b %. This effect comes from the fact that a Hicks-neutral productivity shock increases gross output (sales), not just value added, and has been analyzed by Domar (1961) and Hulten (1978) . 19 18 Here the utility function C− L 1/ξ simply captures the flexibility of labor supply along the business cycle, as formalized in equations (26)- (27) . The linearity in C is for convenience only, as the model abstracts from interest rate movements and capital accumulation.
19 To see this effect most clearly, consider an economy with a production function which, at the level I use the "hat" notation to indicate a proportional change: b Z = dZ/Z. 20 I assume that we start from a steady state equilibrium, and that, in the short run, labor but not capital is reallocated across firms. 21
Models such as (18) always deliver a Sales / Employees ratio that is independent of the firm's productivity. 22 The reason for this almost surely counterfactual prediction, is that labor is assumed to be costlessly adjustable. To capture the realistic case of labor adjustment costs, I
assume that a fraction 1−λ of labor is a quasi-fixed factor, in the sense of Oi (1962) . Technically,
and L F,i are respectively the variable part labor and the quasi-fixed part of labor. After a small shock, only L V,i adjusts. The disutility of labor remains
is aggregate labor. 23 Likewise, I assume that capital is quasi-fixed in the short run. 24 One can now study the effect of a productivity shock b
Proposition 4 Suppose that each firm i receives a productivity shock b A i . Macroeconomic variables change according to:
1/b at the aggregate level. 20 The rules are well-known, and come from taking the logarithm and differentiating. For instance,
21 This formulation allows for other variants. For instance, if both capital and labor can be reallocated, then one replaces α, the current share of labor, by 1.
22 If the sales are
, the frictionless optimum labor supply maximizes f (A i ) L θ i − wL i , and so at the optimum, the ratio of sales per employee, Si/Li = w/θ, is independent of the productivity Ai.
23 Alternatively, one could formulate the disutility of labor as any function v (LV , LF ). ξ is then defined as:
Proposition 4 describes the short term behavior. In a next iteration of this paper, the long term analysis should be provided, including with the adjustment of quasi-fixed labor, and capital. One can anticipate that these extensions will not change materially the calibration for the short run.
and firm-level variables change according to:
where
Equation (24) is Hulten's (1978) equation. TFP is entirely the sum of idiosyncratic firm-level
shocks. Otherwise equations (25)- (27) are standard. GDP growth is TFP growth, multiplied by an amplification mechanism, labor supply.
The new results are the firm-level changes, in equations (28)- (32). The economy behaves like a 1-factor model, with an "aggregate shock", the GDP shock b Y . Again, this shock stems from a multitude of idiosyncratic shocks. The "aggregate shock" causes all firm-level quantities to comove. Aggregating, industry-level quantities would comove too. Economically, when firm i has a positive shock, it makes the aggregate economy more productive (equations 21 and 24), and affect the other firms in three different ways. First, other firms can use more intermediary inputs produced by firm i, hence increasing their production. Second, firm i demands more inputs from the other firms (equation 28), which leads their production to increase. Third,
given firm i commands a large share of output, it will use more of the inputs of the economy, which tends to reduct the other firms' output. 25 The net effect depends on the magnitudes of the elasticities. I calibrate the model using conventional parameters to the extent possible. 26 The labor share is α = 2/3. For the share of intermediate inputs Jorgensen, Gollop and Fraumeni (1987) , 25 In a more general framework (e.g., Acemoglu 2002), firm i could use less of some inputs. 26 Model (18) allows only for 1 firm-level shock, Ai, which generates a perfect correlation between firm-specific movements in sales and employment. However, the data shows the an imperfect correlation between sales and employement of about 1/2, and a correlation between employment and labor productivity (as measured by sales / employees) of about -1/2, which indicates two shocks -perhaps one Hicks neutral productivity or demand shock, and one labor-saving shock. This type of difficulty is familiar, and there is no consensus solution. Hence, the above calibration can only be indicative a definitive one would require a richer model with two types of firm-level shocks. See Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Linde (2004) for a state of the art calibration that takes into account many relevant frictions updated in 1996, provide b = 1/2. 27 The elasticity ψ is a conventional ψ = 1.2. 28 To set ξ ∈ (0, 1), I am guided by (26)-(27). In the business cycle, the volatility of hours is greater than the volatility of the compensation, which means ξ ∈ (1/2, 1). Indeed, the ratio of these volatilities is about 2.5 empirically 29 , which together with (26)-(27) implies ξ = 0.7. By contrast, there is little inherited guidance about the share of labor that is flexible in the short run, λ.
Given λ is between 0 and 1, I rely on Laplace's principle and set λ = 1/2.
Of particular interest is the measure used in section IV, the change in sales per employee, This section presents tentative evidence that the idiosyncratic movements of the top 100 firms explain an important fraction (one third) of the movement of total factor productivity (TFP).
The key challenge is to identify idiosyncratic shocks. Large firms could be volatile because of aggregate shocks, rather than the other way round. I use a variety of ways to attempt to do this.
I start with a parsimonious proxy for the labor productivity of firm i, the log of its sales per worker:
Sales of firm i in year t Number of employees of firm i in year t .
27 I thank Susanto Basu for providing this updated number. 28 A higher ψ may be required to better fit the short run behavior. As Golosov and Lucas (2005) note, this implies that a 10% reduction in price induces a very high quantity response of ψ/ (ψ − 1) × 10% = 60%, which is probably unrealistically large as a short-run response response. Hence, for the purposes of a calibration of short-run shocks, one may need a higher ψ. This problem, they point out, is "endemic" in constant elasticity of substitution models. Other frictions need to be included to solve this problem. I do not attempt to resolve the problem. For the limited purposes of this calibration, ψ = 1.2 is probably a good benchmark. 29 Indeed, in Cooley and Prescott (1995, p.30) , the volatility of hours is 1.64% while the volatility of the wage is 0.65%. This measure is selected as it requires only basic data that is more likely to be available for non-US countries, unlike more sophisticated measures such as a firm-level Solow residual. Most studies that construct productivity measures from Compustat data use (34). I define the productivity growth rate as g it = z it − z it−1 . I focus on the K = 100 firms that had the largest sales in year t − 1. (Results are similar for other choices of K).
Many models, including the model of section III (eq. 32) predict that labor productivity growth rate behaves according to:
where f t is a factor (proportional to GDP growth in equation 32), and b A it is the growth rate of total factor productivity of firm i. The same models also support the following decomposition:
where a t is a shock common to all firms, a I i (t) is a shock specific to the industry I i of firm i, and ε it is a shock that is purely idiosyncratic to firm i. Hence equations 35 and 36 link firm total productivity growth b A it to market and industry factors, and an idiosyncratic component.
Section IV.C analyzes more complex models.
Hulten (1978)'s theorem, and the model of section III, predict that TFP in the economy evolves according to:
My goal is to investigate whether ε it , the idiosyncratic component of the total factor productivity growth rate b A it of large firms, can explain aggregate TFP. 30 Owing to the relationship between b A it and g it , this leads to the definitions:
The granular residual Γ t is defined as:
where g t is the equal-weighted average productivity growth rate of the top K firms:
Definition 2 The granular residual with industry de-meaning Γ ind t is defined as:
where g I(i)t is the equal-weighted average productivity growth rate, amongst the top Q largest firms, for the for firms in i's industry:
and in the top Q firms by sales at t − 1.
The justification for the definitions is as follows. In the residual Γ t , the term g t removes the common shock a t if (36) holds. In the residual Γ ind t , the term g I i t removes the industry shock a t + a I i (t) if (36) Lemma 1 in Appendix 2 indicates that the definition of Γ t and Γ ind t is optimal, in the sense of maximizing the correlation with TFP while purging common shocks. 31 Also, the Web Appendix to this paper shows that identification is achieved if the number K of firms in the granular residual is very large. 32 31 Finally, an alternative definition would be to place GDP in the denominator of (38). In practice, such a measure is well correlated with the granular residual, and yields very similar results.
32 As the Web Appendix to this paper shows, with small K, the R 2 is underestimates the true R * 2 of the idiosyncratic shocks, by a factor 1 −
is about 0.6. Hence, if R 2 empirically found R 2 is 1/3, the R 2 of true idiosyncratic shocks is R * 2 = 1/2. On the other hand, if the number of firms K becomes very large, 1 − 1 KH K tends to 1, and the R 2 becomes unbiased. I do not pursue that route, because for very large K the homogeneity postulate (36) is less likely to hold.
A simple example illustrates the granular residual. 33 Suppose that the economy is made of one big firm, which produces half of output, a hundred small ones. The standard deviation of all growth rates is 10%, and growth rates are given by g it = a t + ε it , where a t is a common shock.
Suppose that in a given year, GDP increases by 3%, and the big firm has growth of, say, 6%, while the average of the small ones is close to 0%. What can we infer on the origins of shocks?
If one thinks of all this being generated by an aggregate shock of 3%, then the distribution of implied idiosyncratic shocks is 3% for the big firm, and −3% on average for all small ones. The probability that the average of the iid small ones is −3%, given the law of large number for these firms, is very small. Hence, it is more likely that the average shock a t is around 0%, and the economy-wide growth of 3% comes from an idiosyncratic shock to the large firm equal 6%. The estimate of the aggregate shock is captured by g t , which is close to 0%, and the estimate of the contribution of idiosyncratic shocks is captured by the granular residual, Γ = 3%. Compustat contains some large outliers, which may result from extraordinary events, such as a merger. To handle potential outliers, I "winsorize" the extreme growth rates. Specifically, I
IV.B. Empirical implementation
construct:
using the trimming function
, but the results are not materially sensitive to this threshold.) In other words, when a growth rate is larger than 20%, I replace the growth rate by 20%, and I do the same for negative growth rates. values, explain slightly over 1/3 of the fluctuations of GDP growth and the Solow residual.
If only aggregate shocks were important (f t in Eq. 35), then the R 2 of the regressions in Table   I would be zero. Hence the good explanatory power of the granular residual is inconsistent with a representative firm framework. It is also inconsistent with the hypothesis that most firm-level volatility might be due to a zero-sum redistribution of market shares.
[Insert Table I about here] Table I indicates that the lagged granular residual predicts GDP growth. This may reflect several mechanisms: autocorrelation at the firm level; imitation dynamics, where a successful technology is imitated by other firms; time aggregation; and the propagation of shocks along supply and demand chains, as in Long and Plosser (1983) .
[Insert Table II about here]
We next turn to the granular residual with industry-specific de-meaning, Γ ind t , using 2 digit SIC codes to define the industries. Table II presents the results, which are consistent with those in Table I . The R 2 's are slightly higher, with an average of 35% across specifications. The similarity of the results is not surprising, as the correlation between Γ t and Γ ind t is 0.80.
In conclusion, idiosyncratic movements of the top 100 firms seem to explain a large fraction of the Solow residual and GDP fluctuations.
IV.C. Robustness checks
The main objection to the granular residual is that the control for the common factors may be imperfect. This section shows that the explanatory power of the granular residual is not diminished by controlling for previously studied common shocks. Following the work of Hamilton (2003) and Romer and Romer (2004) , I control for oil and monetary policy shocks. To arrive at an annual frequency, I sum the shocks over the years. Further analysis shows that the results seem reasonably robust to changes in the number of large firms K, the number of firms for the industry controls Q, and the trimming level.
Another potential objection to the granular residual is that, while Γ ind t controls for industry shocks and common shocks in model (36), it may not control well for them in an alternative model such as:
Given the short sample, if the β i 's are completely unconstrained, there does not seem to be any manageable way to estimate (44) and obtain clean enough estimates of the ε it to form a granular residual of their weighted sum, and test the granular hypothesis. 35 Thus, some parametric restriction seem necessary. The most natural is that the sensitivity to shock might depend on firm size. Accordingly, I consider the following model:
where ε it is orthogonal to g It , and ln S j,t−1;,j∈I i is the mean log size of firms in i's industry. I estimate it by running the OLS regression:
which yields b = −0.15 (s.e. 0.04). 36 This result mean that large firms are actually less sensitive to aggregate shocks than small firms. Hence, in the definition of Γ t (respectively Γ ind t ), g t (respectively g I i t ) adds a negative loading on the industry and GDP shocks. Hence the results from Γ t and Γ ind t are biased against the granular hypothesis. I conclude that consideration of 35 For instance, if one regresses g it on GDP, and take the residuals, then tautologically the residuals will be orthogonal to GDP, which by construction contradicts the granular hypothesis. Also, oil and monetary shocks are not good instruments, as they can affect an industry directly.
36 Estimating: git − g t = b ln Si,t−1 − ln Sj,t−1 g t +noiseit, gives a similar b = −0.15 (s.e. 0.05). The above results are considered provisional. The situation is the analogue, with smaller stakes, to that of the Solow residual. 37 Solow understood at the outset that there are very strong assumptions in the construction of his residual, in particular fully capacity utilization, no fixed cost etc. But a "purified" granular residual took decades to construct (e.g., Basu et al. 2004) , and requires much better data, is harder to replicate in other countries, and relies on special assumptions as well. Because of that, the Solow residual still endures, at least as a first pass.
In the present paper too, it is good to have a first step in the granular residual, together with caveats that may help future research do construct a better residual. Figure   IV presents a scatter plot with Γ t + Γ t−1 , a choice motivated by the fact that Γ t and Γ t−1 have similar coefficients in the regressions of Table I. 37 I thank Steve Durlauf for this intepretation.
IV.D. A brief narrative of GDP and the granular residual
While a full narrative is outside the scope of this paper, this section proposes an interpretation of the most extreme points. 38 A general caveat is that the direction of the causality is generally hard to assess definitively, as the measures g t for aggregate economy-wide and industry-wide movements are imperfect.
The bottom right quadrant of Figure IV contains two outliers. 1954 can be attributed to the end of the Korean War. 1982 is commonly called the Volcker recession.
The first "granular year" may be 1955, which experiences a high GDP growth, and a reasonably high granular residual. The likely microfoundation is a boom in car production. Two main specific factors seem to explain the car boom: the introduction of new models of cars (Gordon 1980) , and the fact that car companies engaged in a price war (Bresnahan 1987) . In 1955, the granular residual is 1.65%, of which 75% is solely due to General Motors. 39 38 Gordon (1980) , Temin (1998) , and the reports of the Council of Economic Advisors provide useful narratives. 39 This number is the fraction due to General Motors in the numerator of equation 38. By this definition, the sum of the shares is 1. 40 To completely resolve the matter, one would like to control for the effect of the Korean war. 41 Temin (1988) notes that the winding down of the Vietnam War (which ended in 1975) may also be responsible for the slump of 1970. This is in part the case, as during 1968 to 1972 the ratio of defense outlays to GDP was 9. 5, 8.7, 8.1, 7.3, 6 .7%. On the other hand, the ratio of total government outlays to GDP were respectively 20.6, 19.4, 19.3, 19.5, 19 Figure IV: Growth of GDP per Capita against Γ t + Γ t−1 , the granular residual and its lagged value. The display of Γ t + Γ t−1 is motivated by Table I , which yields regression coefficients on Γ t and Γ t−1 that are similar in magnitude.
point.
Another interesting granular event happens in 1971. The Council of Economic Advisors (1972, p.33) reports that "prospects of a possible steel strike after July 31st [1971] , the expiration day of the labor contracts, caused steel consumers to build up stock in the first seven months of 71, after which these inventories were liquidated." Here, a granular shock -the possibility of a steel strike -creates a large swing in inventories. Without exploring inventories here, one notes that such a plausibly orthogonal inventory shock could be used in future macroeconomic studies. 42 Figure IV reveals that in the 1990s, granular shocks are smaller. Likewise, GDP volatility is smaller, a phenomenon explored in the literature. 43 Under a granular view, this might be because firm-level shocks were minor, particularly for large firms. Indeed, there is some evidence that, 42 Although 1974 is not a granular year, the low value of the granular residual reflects the fact that the top three car companies, and particularly General Motors, were disproportionately affected by the shock. It is likely that, if large companies were producing more fuel efficient models, the granular residual would have been closer to 0, and the slump of 1974 could have been much more moderate. 43 See, for example, Blanchard and Johnson (2001), McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) , and Stock and Watson (2003) .
though the median firm in Compustat experienced a rise in volatility (Campbell et al. 2001 , Chaney, Gabaix and Philippon 2003 , Comin and Mulani 2005 , Comin and Philippon 2005 , the very large firms experienced a volatility decrease. 44 Further research is needed to assess this hypothesis.
V. Empirical evidence on concentration and firm-level volatility
This section illustrates that idiosyncratic fluctuations are indeed of the correct order of magnitude to explain aggregate shocks.
V.A. Large firms are very volatile
Most estimates of plant-level volatility find very large volatilities of sales and employment, with an order of magnitude σ = 30% to σ = 50% per year (Caballero and Engel 2004 , Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger 1997 , Davis, Haltiwanger, Schuh 1996 . Also, the volatility of firm size in Compustat is a very large 40% per year (Chaney, Gabaix and Philippon 2004, Comin and Mulani 2005) . Much of the work has been focused on the median firm, but the present paper requires an estimate of the volatility of large firms. This sub-section therefore studies the volatility of the top 100 non-oil industry firms each year.
Measuring firm volatility is difficult, because various frictions and identifying assumptions provide conflicting predictions about links between changes in total factor productivity and changes in observable quantities such as sales and employment (Proposition 4). I consider the volatility of three measures of growth rates: ∆ ln (Sales it /Employees it ), ∆ lnSales it and ∆ lnEmployees it . For each measure and each year, I calculate the cross-sectional variance amongst the top 100 firms of the previous year, and take the average. 45 I find a standard deviation of 12%, 12% and 13% for, respectively, for growth rates of the sales per employee, of sales, and of employees. Also, amongst the top 100 firms, the sample correlations are 0.04, 0.15 44 As per Eq. 3, the weighing for the relevant "average" firm level volatility is the square of the sales, not the sales. This weighing gives an enormously higher weight to the top firms. A future paper will develop this point, which requires some statistical care, as standard analysis based on standard errors cannot be applied. Most moments here are infinite. 45 In other term, for each year t, I calculate the cross-sectional variance of growth rates, σ
, with K = 100. The corresponding average standard deviation is [T
and 0.07 respectively, for each of the three measure. 46 Hence the correlation between growth rates is small. At the firm level, most variation is idiosyncratic. 47
In conclusion, the top 100 firms have a volatility of 12% based on sales per employee. In what follows I use σ = 12% per year for firm-level volatility as baseline estimate.
V.B. Herfindahls and induced volatility
This sub-section discusses the theoretically appropriate measure of the firm size, for use in constructing the Herfindahl index. The key is given by Hulten's (1978) result, which shows that total sales, rather than value added, is the appropriate measure. Consider an economy with several competitive firms or sectors, and let firm i have a Hicks-neutral productivity growth dπ i .
Hulten (1978) shows that the increase in TFP is:
The weights add up to more than 1. This reflects the fact that productivity growth in a firm generates an increase in the economic value of all the inputs it uses. The firms' sales are the proper statistics for that social value. For completeness, Appendix 2 rederives and generalizes
Hulten's theorem.
I now draw the implications for GDP volatility. Suppose productivity shocks dπ i are uncorrelated with standard deviation σ π . Then, the variance of productivity growth is:
and so the volatility of the growth of TFP is:
46 For each year, we measure the sample correlation ρt =
with K = 100. 47 Hence another indirect measure is the volatility of idiosyncratic stock market returns. If a firm produces ait per year, of which a fraction f is paid in dividends, and the dividend grows at a rate µ, then the Gordon formula predicts a stock price p t = a t f/ (R − µ), where R is the discount rate. In particular, the volatility of returns is equal to the volatility of productive capacity a. For the top 100 largest firms, I find an average annualized volatility of idiosyncratic returns of σ = 27%.
where h S is the sales Herfindahl
Hulten's theorem allows us to simplify the analysis. For the total volatility, one does not need to know the details of the input-output matrix. The sales Herfindahl is a sufficient statistic.
The international Herfindahls are from Acemoglu, Johnson and Mitton (2004) . They analyze the Dun and Bradstreet dataset, which has a good coverage of the major firms in many countries. 48 [Insert Table V 
The calibration of section III gives µ = 1/ (1 − αξ) = 1.9, which is the value I use for short term volatility. As seen above, a baseline estimate for the firm-level volatility is σ π = 12%.
Table V displays the results. The sales Herfindahl h S is quite large: h S = 22% average over all countries, and h S = 6.1% for the U.S. By Eq. 48 this implies a GDP volatility σ GDP = 1.9 × 12% × 6.1% = 1.4% for the U.S., and σ GDP = 1.9 × 12% × 22% = 5.0% for a typical country. This is very much in the order of magnitude of GDP fluctuations. As always, further amplification mechanisms can increase the estimate. I conclude that idiosyncratic volatility seems quantitatively large enough to matter at the macroeconomic level. 48 There may be problems with multinationals. For instance, the sales of G.M. are probably counted as the worldwide sales of G.M. 49 If
Λt ∼ e γt , and capital is accumulated, then in balanced growth path, Yt ∼ Kt ∼ Λ 1/α t . In the long run, ∆ ln Y t = µ∆ ln Λ t , with µ = 1/α. This holds also with stochastic growth. If ln Λ t is a Brownian motion with drift,
VI. Conclusion
This paper argues that idiosyncratic shocks to the top 100 firms explain a large fraction (one third) of aggregate volatility. While aggregate fluctuations such as changes to monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policy, and aggregate productivity shocks, are clearly important drivers of macroeconomic activity, they are not the only contributors to GDP fluctuations. Using theory, calibration and direct empirical evidence, this paper makes the case that idiosyncratic shocks are an important, and possibly the major, part of the origin of business-cycle fluctuations.
The importance of idiosyncratic shocks in aggregate volatility leads to a number of implications and directions for future research. First, and most evidently, to understand the origins of fluctuations better one should not focus exclusively on aggregate shocks, but concrete shocks to large players, such as Wal-Mart, Intel, and Nokia.
Second, shocks to large firms (such as a strike, a new innovation or a CEO change), initially independent of the rest of the economy, offer a rich source of shocks for VARs and impulse response studies -the real-side equivalent of the "Romer and Romer" shocks for monetary economics.
Third, this paper gives a new theoretical angle for the propagation of fluctuations. If WalMart innovates, its competitors may suffer in the short term and thus race to catch up. This creates rich industry-level dynamics (that are already actively studied in the industrial organization literature) that should be useful for studying macroeconomic fluctuations, since they allow one to trace the dynamics of productivity shocks.
Fourth, this argument could explain the reason why people, in practice, do not know "the state of the economy". This is because "the state of the economy" depends on the behavior (productivity and investment behavior, among others) of many large and interdependent firms. Thus the integration is not easy, and no readily-accessible single number can summarize this state.
This contrasts with aggregate measures, such as GDP, which are easily observable. Conversely, agents that focus on aggregate measures may make incorrect inferences. For example, the aggregate dividend-price ratio is often used as a key business cycle variable. However, changes in aggregate dividends may stem only from the policies of a small number of firms, as found by DeAngelo et al (2004) . This paper therefore could offer a new mechanism for the dynamics of "animal spirits".
Finally this mechanism might explain a large part of the volatility of many aggregate quan-tities other than output, for instance, inventories, inflation, short-or long-run movements in productivity, and the current account. The latter is explored in Canals et al. (2005) .
In sum, this paper suggests that the study of very large firms can offer a fresh angle of attack on some open issues of macroeconomics.
Appendix 1: Lévy's theorem
The basic theorem can be found in most probability textbooks, e.g. Durrett (1996, p.153) .
Theorem 5 Suppose that X 1 , X 2 , ... are i.i.d. with a distribution that satisfies:
with ζ ∈ (0, 2) and L (x) slowly varying 50 . Let s n = P n i=1 X i , and a n = inf {x :
The most typical use of Lévy's theorem is the case of a distribution with zero mean and power-
Then a n ∼ x 0 n 1/ζ , b n = 0, and For ζ = 2, a Lévy distribution is a Gaussian. For ζ < 2, the distribution has power law tail with exponent ζ.
Appendix 2: Longer derivations
Hulten's theorem with and without instantaneous reallocation of factors
For clarity, I re-derive and extend Hulten (1978) 's result, which says that a Hicks-neutral productivity shock dπ i to firm i causes an increase in TFP equal to:
There are N firms. Firm i produces good i, and uses a quantity X ij of intermediary inputs from firm j. It also uses L i units of labor, K i units of capital. It has productivity π i . If production is:
The representative agent consumes C i of good i, and has a utility function is U (C 1 , ..., C N ). Production of firm i serves as consumption, and intermediary inputs, so:
The optimum in this economy reads:
The Lagrangian is:
Assume marginal cost pricing. 51 GDP is this economy is Y = wL + rK = P i p i C i . The value added of firm i is wL i + rK i , and its sales are p i Q i .
If each firm i has a shock dπ i to productivity, I differentiate the expression of W to find TFP growth:
which is Eq. 47.
The above analysis shows that Hulten's theorem holds even if, after the shock, the capital, labor, and material inputs are not reallocated. This is a simple consequence of the envelope theorem. Hence Hulten's result also holds if there are frictions to adjust labor, capital, or intermediate inputs.
Proof of Proposition 1
Since σ GDP = σh, I examine h. Basu and Fernald (2001) provide an analysis with imperfect competition.
The law of large numbers ensures that
Proof of Proposition 2
Since σ GDP = σh, I examine h.
I treat the cases where ζ > 1 and ζ = 1 separately. When ζ > 2, the variance of firm sizes is finite, and we use Proposition 1.
When 1 < ζ ≤ 2. By the law of large numbers,
I, S 2 i has power law exponent ζ/2 ≤ 1, as shown by:
So to handle the numerator of (51), I use Lévy's Theorem from Appendix 1. This implies:
where u is a Lévy distributed random variable with exponent ζ/2. So
When ζ = 1. Additional care is required, because E [S] = ∞. Lévy's Theorem 5 in Appendix 1 gives b n = n ln n, hence:
where g is a Lévy with exponent 1. I conclude ln N · h → d u 1/2 /g.
Proof of Proposition 3
When ζ > 1, by the law of large numbers:
To tackle the numerator, I observe that S 1−α i has power law tails with exponent ζ 0 = ζ/ (1 − α). I consider two cases.
u i , which has power law tails with exponent ζ 0 , and by Lévy's theorem:
where g is a Lévy with exponent ζ 0 .
u i has finite variance, and N −1/2 ∆Y t → d g, where g is a Gaussian.
In both cases:
for a distribution g. So, when ζ > 1:
Hence the proposition holds, with
When ζ = 1, a ln N correction appears, as in the proof of Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 4
Step 1. Frictionless equilibrium. I define:
The price of firm i is:
/H, and
Because H is homogenous of degree 1,
H is the sum of sales in the economy.
I use ∝ to mean that the variables are proportional, up to a factor that does not depend
, and using the adding up constraint
, we find the constant of proportionality:
Plugging this in (53), we get:
Now, we solve for X, i.e. solve max X H − X. The solution is:
i.e. the announced relation. Also, as Y = H − P X i , and
Step 2. Changes, assuming λ = 1. To keep the proof streamlined, I first consider the case λ = 1, i.e. the case no frictions in the adjustment of labor.
We now look at the changes. TFP growth comes from (21), and is also Hulten's formula.
As the total production is:
ξ − 1´b L, which gives the announced value. It is convenient that one can solve for changes in the macroeconomic variables without revisiting the firms' decision problems.
We now turn to the firm-level changes. Optimization of the demand for labor gives
which gives the announced expressions for b
Step 3. With a general λ ∈ [0, 1] .
After the changes b A i , only L V,i can adjust. First, we remark that the utility function is
, so the elasticity associated with L V is ξ 0 = ξ/λ, while the production share of L V is α 0 = αλ. Hence, the expression (25) for GDP holds, replacing (α, ξ) by (α 0 , ξ 0 ) = (αλ, ξ/λ).
Furthermore, the planner solves:
, for a constant .
There are now two wages, w V and w F , which are the marginal products of respectively L V and
Y , and the weighted wage changes as:
Hence expressions (24)-(27) do not change with a general λ.
For the firm-level variables, one replaces (α, ξ) by (α 0 , ξ 0 ) = (αλ, ξ/λ), which delivers the expressions (28)-(30) and (33). The expression for employment becomes:
, which gives expression (31). The expression
Lemma 1
The following Lemma is used in section IV.
Lemma 1 Suppose a world where
A it , and the productivity shocks b A it are uncorrelated and have equal variance. Consider the class of residuals of the form
w i = 0, so that Γ 0 t is not affected by f t . One seeks residuals Γ 0 t that have the greatest correlation with b Λ t , i.e. which solve max w i corr
The highest correlation is achieved by any multiple of the granular residual Γ t given in (38).
Proof of Lemma 1. Given for any k > 0, corr ³ b Λ t , kΓ 0 t´i s independent of k, one first looks at the residuals Γ 0 t with a given variance, say 1. The problem is then: max w i cov
var (Γ 0 t ) = 1 and
w i = 0. Calling σ 2 = var b A it , one forms the Lagrangian
Forming 0 = ∂L/∂w i = Y −1 γσ 2 S i − 2λγ 2 σ 2 w i − µ, so the optimal weights are of the form: w i = aS i + b, with a and b independent of i. Condition P w i = 0 gives: w i = a ³ S i − K −1 P K j=1 S j´, and a residual Γ 0 t = a P S i (g it − g t ), which proves the Proposition. (2003) and Romer-Romer (2004 All Countries USA Sales Herfindahl h S 22.0 6.1 GDP volatility induced by idiosyncratic firm-level shocks σ GDP = µσ π h S 5.0 1.4 Table V : Sales herfindahl h S (eq. 49) in 2002, and induced GDP volatility. Units are in %. For the induced GDP volatility, I take σ GDP = µσh S , with a firm-level volatility σ = 12% (eq. 50), and an amplification factor µ = 1.9, as discussed in the text. Source: Acemoglu, Johnson and Mitton (2004) for the international data, and Compustat for the U.S. data.
